Greece, Turkey ‘came very close’ to resolving problems

Imposing yet affable, former Turkish prime minister and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu arrives in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, as an honorary guest of the Delphi Forum. His speech is measured, befitting the description of him as the “calm force” of Turkish diplomacy.

From 2002 to 2016, he helped shape Turkey’s foreign policy and became widely recognized as the architect of “Neo-Ottomanism” – a term he now disavows. Once the right-hand man of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he is now one of his fiercest critics and the founder of the Future Party. Though a proponent of Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Davutoglu still defends the “Blue Homeland” doctrine as a response to what he calls Turkey’s geopolitical encirclement, warning that any unilateral Greek moves in the Aegean or Eastern Mediterranean are “Russian roulette.”

The PKK has announced an end to its armed struggle after 40 years. Although many details remain unclear – such as where and when weapons will be surrendered – the pro-Kurdish DEM party has urged Erdogan to take confidence building measures. Do you believe he will?

For four decades, the PKK has created major problems not only in Turkey but also in Iraq and Syria. Resolving this issue would be in everyone’s interest. As foreign minister and then prime minister, I supported the peace process from 2013 to 2015. Sometimes, despite your best efforts, you don’t reach a solution because extremist groups legitimize their own existence through the presence of the other. In 2013, [chairman of the far-right, ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet] Bahceli and the nationalist circles in Turkey opposed the process. But now, Bahceli himself has initiated it. He even used to call me “Serok Ahmet” because of my close ties with the Kurds. Regionally, 2013 was a different world. Syria’s crisis, ISIS’ rise, Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and Egypt’s coup reshaped the environment. The PKK shifted its stance, seeking to control parts of Syria and establish a new base. Now, Turkish influence in Syria is at its peak, and a new administration with close ties to Turkey is in place. The key step is disarmament. Without it, we can’t move forward. My recommendation is not to delay the next steps, start within a week or two. A real disarmament process is needed, not just symbolic statements. The PKK must fully abandon armed struggle, and its leadership must cease militant actions for their own good.

Turkey is at the center of global geopolitics, hosting talks on Ukraine and Iran’s nuclear program. With Erdogan accumulating political capital, how likely is it he will seek another presidential term?

Turkey’s stance on Ukraine is correct. Active neutrality is the best path for Turkey to play a central role. Back in 2008, during Russia’s invasion of Georgia, we mediated the ceasefire. I personally drafted the “Caucasus Peace Pact” proposal. Today, Turkey is doing its part, but the final decision rests with Putin and Zelenskyy. On Iran, in 2010, as foreign minister, I mediated negotiations between the P5+1 and Tehran. In May of that year, we announced a nuclear agreement based on a letter from President Obama, following 17 hours of nonstop talks. That said, this is Turkey’s external image. If the president achieves something internationally, he can capitalize on it. But constitutionally, this is his last term. A constitutional amendment would be required for another run. No one can predict what will happen in the coming years. Still, we can’t overlook the collapsing economy, surging poverty, rampant corruption, and restricted freedom of thought. Foreign policy wins are significant, but people vote based on their everyday lives, mainly the economy.

Following Assad’s fall, Turkey has maintained troops in northern and northwestern Syria, and so has Israel in the southwest. With both sides entrenching their positions and harsh words exchanged between Erdogan and Netanyahu, is there room for rapprochement?

‘We can’t overlook the collapsing economy, surging poverty, rampant corruption, and restricted freedom of thought. Foreign policy wins are significant, but people vote based on their everyday lives’ 

The issue is not between Turkey and Israel. The issue is between Israel and humanity. Let me be very clear Israel is committing genocide and seeks to wipe out Gaza. It is conducting ethnic cleansing. These acts are crimes that should be brought before the International Criminal Court. Israel is also attempting to destabilize Lebanon and Syria. After the 1982-83 Lebanon War and the occupation of Beirut, where atrocities like those in Sabra and Shatila occurred, Israel believes it has the right to intervene militarily in southern Lebanon. It is now trying to replicate this tactic in Syria, which is a blatant violation of international law. Should such military actions extend into northern Syria, it would pose a direct threat to Turkey. Israel’s strategy is to sow discord between Turks and Kurds, Turks and Arabs, Kurds and Arabs, Iranians and others. But despite its technological superiority, it has failed for nearly two years to defeat a people without a conventional army. In 1967, Israel defeated four Arab states in six days. Today, with all that military power, it cannot even control Gaza.

Trump and Erdogan have developed a relationship of mutual respect. Reports suggest the US may lift remaining restrictions hindering defense cooperation, with the State Department recently approving the sale of advanced missile systems. How do you interpret Turkey’s position under these conditions?

Turkey and the US are two nations with significant strategic interests. This is not about personal relationships. We need a sound and rational approach. When I was foreign minister and Hillary Clinton held the same post, we spoke on the basis that Turkey is a powerful nation at the heart of Afro-Eurasia, with access to the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, while the US is a global power. Neither country can afford to ignore the other. Therefore, a more strategic approach is needed – based on institutions and long-term strategy, not just personal rapport between presidents.

How close are Greece and Turkey to developing a roadmap that could potentially refer their core dispute – regarding EEZs and continental shelves – to the International Court of Justice in The Hague?

We must introduce the concept of empathy into Greek-Turkish relations. In Athens in 2010, we held joint cabinet meetings and signed 25 agreements in a single day. That was more significant than 90 years of diplomatic ties. However, if Greece claims that the EEZ belongs to it solely and seeks to control the entire maritime and economic zone, that’s unacceptable. No Turkish government would ever accept this. Turkey has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean and cannot be confined. Likewise, Turkey must view the Aegean not as a space of competition and hegemony but as a sea of cooperation. There is immense potential for collaboration. If there are natural resources in the area, they should be jointly explored and shared.

In 2011, you were Turkey’s foreign minister. At that time, did we come close to a solution on Cyprus and maritime zones – or at least to a framework? What were the main pillars?

We came very close. There were exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece, based on mutual interests. Unfortunately, after my resignation, the talks stopped. There was significant progress on resolving continental shelf and maritime zone issues. It was a comprehensive package. You can settle differences at The Hague, but legal arguments exist on both sides. The outcome is uncertain, and the ruling could act as a guillotine. I was part of the Turkish negotiating team in Burgenstock in 2004. A huge opportunity was lost. Back then, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Gul, and all of us took a major risk. Sadly, the Greek side said no. When time passes without resolution, old solutions lose traction. It’s been 21 years since the Annan Plan, and the two communities are more divided than ever. Shared memories fade. Property issues remain unresolved. It’s a major missed opportunity. The best current option is a two-state solution under EU supervision.

Do you view the “Blue Homeland” as a continuation of your strategic vision, as laid out in your book “Strategic Depth,” and does it align with the concept of Neo-Ottomanism?

In my book, I proposed a new regional order around Turkey – the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus – not a strategy of Turkish hegemony. I reject the term “Neo-Ottomanism.” It’s used by specific circles to incite Arabs against us. As for the Blue Homeland, it is a reaction to the Seville Map, which restricts Turkey to the Gulf of Antalya. Turkey is right to say no. At the end of the day, this Blue Homeland belongs to all of us. No one can trap Turkey in the Mediterranean. We can either collaborate and rise as two ascending stars – or fail by fighting each other, manipulated by outside powers.

How do you view Greece’s cooperation with Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus? Are these alliances targeting Turkey?

If Turkey gets isolated, this will be a dangerous game – like Russian roulette. The effort to isolate Turkey through tripartite alliances with Greece, Israel, and Egypt is misguided and immature. Propaganda is easy; building a spirit of cooperation is hard. If a problem seems insoluble, put it aside and continue cooperating. Over time, that problem will shrink. That’s my advice to my Greek friends: Talk to Turkey with goodwill. Don’t sideline us. We could form a common Eastern Mediterranean Association – Greece, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon. Everyone would benefit.